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 GENERALIZED Q MODELS FOR INVESTMENT
 Marzio Galeotti and Fabio Schiantarelli*
 Abstract-We extend the Q theory of investment to allow for
 adjustment costs for labor, under the additional assumption
 that the firm is a monopolistic competitor in the output
 market. The issue of nonconstant returns to scale is also
 discussed. We show that the standard Q model is a special
 case of a more general model involving testable parameter
 restrictions. Estimates for the U.S. manufacturing sector sug-
 gest that the departure from the assumption of perfect com-
 petition and lack of adjustment costs for labor receive empiri-
 cal support in the data.
 I. Introduction
 IN recent years Q models have become the
 standard paradigm used to analyze investment
 decisions (see, for instance, Summers (1981),
 Hayashi (1982), Poterba and Summers (1983),
 Abel and Blanchard (1986)). A fair summary of
 their performance suggests that theoretical neat-
 ness has been rarely matched by empirical suc-
 cess. This has led to several attempts to extend
 the basic framework in order to provide a better
 explanation for the actual fluctuations of invest-
 ment over time and/or for its variations across
 firms. For example, the specification of the tech-
 nology has become richer and multiple capital
 inputs have been allowed for (Wildasin (1984),
 Chirinko (1984), and Hayashi and Inoue (1990)),
 and attention has been paid to the relationship
 between investment and financing decisions, es-
 pecially when there are capital market imper-
 fections (Hayashi (1985), Chirinko (1987), and
 Fazzari et al. (1988)). Finally, the implications of
 the assumption of monopolistic competition in
 the product market for the specification and esti-
 mation of Q models have been examined by
 Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) and by
 Chirinko and Fazzari (1988). Most of these exten-
 sions invalidate the simple and appealing equality
 between marginal and average Q that holds un-
 der the assumption of linear homogeneity of the
 production and adjustment cost functions and
 perfect competition in the product market, as
 shown in Hayashi (1982).
 Another natural extension that we explore in
 this paper is to assume that it is costly to change
 not only the capital stock but also employment.
 The idea that both labor and capital are costly to
 adjust and that such costs may be interrelated is
 an old one (see Lucas (1967) and Nadiri and
 Rosen (1969)) and has been a main feature of
 most recent work in dynamic factor demand (see
 Prucha and Nadiri (1986) for a thorough review).
 One of the approaches has been to estimate the
 Euler equations for the dynamic optimization
 problem as in Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983),
 McIntosh (1983), and Shapiro (1986). Our gener-
 alization of the Q model to the case of convex
 adjustment costs for labor is closer in spirit to
 these papers, while maintaining a relationship
 between investment and average Q, albeit in a
 modified form. In addition to treating labor as a
 quasi-fixed factor, we also allow for monopolistic
 competition in the output market. The issue of
 nonconstant returns to scale is discussed as well.
 In section II we first derive the relationship
 between the shadow prices of capital and labor
 and the market value of the firm under these
 assumptions. By substituting out the unobserv-
 able shadow prices of capital and labor, we show
 how to obtain a simple dynamic equation contain-
 ing only actual values or expectations of observ-
 able variables. This equation clarifies the rela-
 tionship between investment, on the one hand,
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 and average Q, output, and the cost of adjusting
 employment, on the other.
 Lack of adjustment costs for labor, perfect
 competition in the output market, and constant
 returns to scale are special cases of our general
 model involving testable parameter restrictions.
 In section III estimates for the U.S. manufactur-
 ing sector are presented. The results show that
 the assumption of a monopolistically competitive
 firm facing adjustment costs for capital and labor
 receives more empirical support than the stan-
 dard version of Q type of investment models. The
 estimates of the demand and adjustment cost
 parameters implied by our results are also dis-
 cussed in this section.
 II. The Model
 The two basic assumptions of the model devel-
 oped in this section are that the firm is a
 monopolistic competitor and that it faces convex
 internal costs in adjusting capital and labor. We
 assume, moreover, that the adjustment costs for
 changing the number of workers are far more
 important than the costs associated with changing
 the number of hours so that the latter can be set
 to zero in our production function. This assump-
 tion is quite plausible on a priori grounds and is
 supported by empirical evidence (Shapiro (1986)).
 However, changes in hours may affect the aver-
 age cost of a worker, due to the existence of an
 overtime premium.
 Denote output, capital, employment, average
 hours, investment and gross hiring respectively by
 Y, K, L, H, I, X. The net production function is
 given by Y = F(K, L, H, I, X), where F, < 0,
 F,, < 0, FX < 0, and FXX < 0. The firm maxi-
 mizes the present value of cash flow and it is
 assumed to use retention financing at the margin.
 For the purpose of showing the relationship be-
 tween investment, hiring, and the average value
 of the firm and output, it is convenient to write
 the objective function as
 00
 V,= E,>{E'+i[(1 - r,+j)Pt+1
 j=o
 XF(Kt+j, Lt+j, I,+j, Ht+j, X,+j)
 -F i- O U+jX(1 -U+j)P,I+jI,+j]
 +A Bt (1)
 1'8 = jk=i(l + ps)l is the discount rate and p
 is the appropriate rate of return assumed to be
 nonstochastic. P is the own price and it is a
 choice variable for the firm. P' is the price of
 new investment goods, r is the corporate tax rate,
 u the present value of tax savings associated with
 depreciation allowances and tax credits. A is the
 present value of tax savings on depreciation al-
 lowances for investment made before period t. A
 similar breakdown has been used for labor costs
 because it clarifies the derivation of the relation-
 ship between the shadow values of capital and
 labor and the market value of the firm. w, +
 represents the present value of labor costs on
 workers hired from time t + j onward:
 00
 j7+ = E 8V+j+ - l- JW,( - ) )(t +j)
 v = t +j
 (2a)
 where w is the labor cost per man and y the
 exogenous quit rate for workers, which for expo-
 sitional simplicity is assumed to be constant. Note
 that Pt+i+1 equals one by definition. Bt is, in-
 stead, the present value of labor costs for workers
 hired before time t and is defined as
 00 - 00
 = ~~ f3t+i Bt Et E,\ E ,B'j,wt+j(1 , r+i)
 j=0 V=t-1
 X(1 - y)t+j;Xv} (2b)
 (1 - y)
 - ~~~~L 1EtT_t
 =(1 + ) Pt) tt
 B, is obviously predetermined for the firm at time
 t. The maximization problem is subject to the
 equations of motion for capital and employment:
 Kt = It + (1 - )Kt,_ (3a)
 Lt = Xt + (1- y)Lt-1. (3b)
 8 is the rate of capital depreciation. Denote with
 AK and AL the Lagrange multipliers associated
 with equations (3a) and (3b), respectively. Denot-
 ing with e the price elasticity of output demand,
 the first order conditions for investment, hiring,
 the capital stock, and the stock of workers can be
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 written as
 Et ( 1 - r) P 1 - F
 -(1 - ut)Ptl + AK} =0 (4a)
 Et(1 - rt )Pt1 - - FX- + AL) = 0
 (4b)
 - Tt)Pt(1 - ? ) K -
 + 4+J 0 (4c)
 Et((1 - r,)P(1 - -) FL -A
 + 1 YAL} =0 . (4d)
 What is the relationship between the shadow
 value of capital and labor and the market value of
 the firm in this model? As in conventional Q
 models of investment, we start by assuming that
 the net production function is homogeneous of
 degree one in K, L, I, and X. It is easy to prove
 that the following relationship holds:1
 (1 - y)L1AL + (1 -)AK K
 Vt [V-At + Bt -Ct,](1 + pt) (5)
 where
 Ct= Et{ E t P'+ +jY +1 (6)
 j=o Et +j
 Equation (5) says that the shadow price of the
 quasi-fixed factors, multiplied by their respective
 quantities, equals the market value of the firm,
 Vt, adjusted for (i) the present value of tax sav-
 ings due to depreciation allowances on past in-
 vestment, At; (ii) the present value of wage costs
 for workers hired in the past, B,, given in (2b);
 (iii) the present value of the loss in monopoly
 profits due to the price reduction necessary, ce-
 teris paribus, to generate the demand to absorb
 an increase in production, C,, given in (6). If
 there is perfect competition in the output market,
 et+j = oo and Ct = 0. The expressions in (5) and
 (6) extend to the case of monopolistic competi-
 tion and labor as a quasi-fixed factor the result
 obtained by Wildasin (1984) for multiple capital
 inputs.
 Note that there is a subtle difference between
 allowing for multiple capital inputs on the one
 hand, and treating both the homogeneous capital
 stock and labor as quasi-fixed inputs on the other.
 Contrary to buying a new capital good, hiring a
 worker generates a sequence of wage payments
 until the worker is made redundant or quits. This
 explains the presence of the B, term on the right
 hand side of (5), capturing the predetermined
 nature of the present value of wage costs for
 workers hired before t. If both B, and AL are set
 to zero, one obtains the discrete time analogue of
 the relationship between marginal and average Q
 under monopolistic competition derived origi-
 nally by Hayashi (1982) and exploited by
 Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990).
 The extension to the case of nonconstant re-
 turns to scale is straightforward. There are two
 options here and it is difficult to choose between
 them on a priori grounds.2 If it is assumed that
 the net production function, F(.), is homoge-
 neous of degree (1 + 0), then we need only to
 modify the definition of C, in (6) by replacing
 l/Et+j with [1 - O(Et+j - 1)I/Et+j. Assume now
 that adjustment costs are additively separable so
 that F(K, L, I, H, X) = f(K, L, H) -
 G(I, X, K, L), where the function f(.) denotes
 the gross production function and G(.) the adjust-
 ment cost function. If f(.) is homogeneous of
 degree (1 + 0) while adjustment costs are still
 linear homogeneous in their arguments, then on
 the right hand side of (5) we should also include
 an additional term, Mt, containing present and
 future adjustment costs. More specifically:
 Mt = EiEf3 + t+1(E,+1-1)
 j=o E +j
 x (1 - rt+j)Pt+jG(t + j)} (7)
 1 In order to obtain (5), multiply (4a) by It, (4b) by X,, (4c)
 by Kt, (4d) by Lt, add the resulting equations together and
 use the linear homogeneity of the production function. De-
 tails on all the derivations are contained in an appendix
 available from the authors upon request.
 2 In the dynamic factor demand literature returns to scale
 are usually specified with respect to the net production func-
 tion (see, e.g., Morrison (1988)). In the Q literature an exam-
 ple is given by Chirinko and Fazzari (1988) and Chirinko
 (1989).
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 Even if the presence of AL, Bt, Ct, and Mt
 introduces a wedge between the marginal and
 average shadow value of capital adjusted for taxa-
 tion, it is possible to use the first order conditions
 for investment and hiring, (4a) and (4b), to obtain
 a dynamic equation linking investment to average
 Q, output, and the marginal adjustment cost for
 employment. Such an equation contains only ob-
 servable variables and disposes of the summation
 of infinite terms contained in Bt, C,, and Mt.
 Focusing on the constant returns to scale case,
 use the first order condition for hiring, (4b), to
 substitute out AL in (5). Using (2b) and solving
 for the shadow price of capital, AK, one obtains:
 AK [V-A-C,](1 +pt)
 (1 - )P (1 - 8)(1 -t)PtKt-,
 (1-6)( e Gx(t)K
 (8)
 Lead (8) one period, multiply by
 (1 -t+l)Pt+lKt
 (1 + Pt+i)(l -t)PtKt-,
 and subtract from (8). This yields:
 ( (1 )P
 (Vt- At)(1 + Pt)
 (18-)(1- t)PtKt-,
 yt
 Et(l -)Kt_1
 + D 1- )Gx(t)L;j 0
 -a (( et Kt_l )
 (9)
 where for ease of notation we have introduced
 the quasi forward difference operator D, such
 that, for any function of time, h(t), D(h(t)) =
 h(t) - qth(t + 1). Using the first order condition
 for investment, (4a), to substitute out AK in (9),
 one obtains:
 Et{((1 - - GI(t) -DQ
 1 Yt (11-)
 Et (1-8)Kt_1 1 - |
 XD((1--)Gx(t) K)} 0 (10)
 where
 (1+pt)(VtAK ) -(1-ut)]
 Pi'
 (1 - r)P (11)
 Qt captures the tax-adjusted ratio between the
 market value of capital and its replacement cost
 and is used as an explanatory variable in standard
 Q models of investment (see Summers (1981) and
 Poterba and Summers (1983)). The output per
 unit of capital variable appears because of the
 assumption of monopolistic competition. The last
 term is present in equation (10) because there are
 adjustment costs associated with changing em-
 ployment. More precisely it reflects the marginal
 adjustment costs for changing the level of em-
 ployment multiplied by the labor-capital ratio.
 For the purpose of empirical implementation
 we will assume that adjustment costs are
 quadratic. Initially, purely for ease of exposition,
 it will also be assumed that there are no cross-
 adjustment costs. The case of interrelated adjust-
 ment costs can be easily accommodated and is
 discussed below. The adjustment cost function
 can be written as
 a ItI 2V cfXt 2
 G = - -- b\ K,+ 2(L -d\) L, (12)
 where a, b, c, d are positive constants. If the price
 elasticity of demand is also constant, then equa-
 tion (10) becomes
 E, D K, = b[l 1-Etq t] + E__ DQ,K a(E - 1)
 a(E-1) (1-8)Kt_1
 a 1 - y E D Xt Lt ,
 a (1 - 5 ) (L K,X
 (13)
 This model encompasses the case of perfect
 competition and of lack of adjustment costs for
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 labor. If there is perfect competition in the prod-
 uct market, e = m. The coefficient in front of the
 output term becomes zero and the one in front of
 the Q terms becomes 1/a. If labor is a variable
 factor, both c and d equal zero, so that the last
 two terms drop out of equation (13). All these
 restrictions are easily testable and this is one of
 the advantages of this formulation. Note, more-
 over, that the equation is just identified and all
 the structural parameters can be recovered. If
 there are nonconstant returns to scale affecting
 the gross production function, then the coeffi-
 cient in front of output becomes [1 - 6 (E -
 1)][a(,E - 1)] and the term (0/2) (1 -
 ,6X((ItKt) - b)2(Kt/Kt-1)] must be added to
 the right hand side of (13). On the other hand,
 when the departure from linear homogeneity af-
 fects only the net production function, no term
 has to be added to (13). In this case the structural
 parameters E and 6 cannot be separately recov-
 ered, based on estimation of (13) alone. However,
 if a demand equation is estimated jointly with
 (13), unique estimates for E and 6 can be ob-
 tained.
 In deriving equation (13) we have assumed that
 the rate of capital depreciation and the quit rate
 are fixed, but the derivations go through when
 this assumption is relaxed. Finally, the interre-
 lated nature of adjustment costs can also be eas-
 ily allowed for by including, for instance, the term
 itx s-' -KaLl-a (O < a <1) (14)
 in the adjustment cost flunction, G(.). Under this
 assumption, as can be seen from (10), an addi-
 tional regressor representing the interaction term
 in G(.) would appear in (13). Given the parame-
 terization adopted in (12), the additional regres-
 sor is
 (1_ ^ )tDtK (L) K )|(15)
 In our empirical work we concentrate on (13)
 and use the framework it provides to test differ-
 ent versions of Q models of investment. Al-
 though the normalization embodied in (13) is not
 the only possible one, it is the most convenient
 one for this purpose. The estimated model will
 also be used to draw inferences on the structure
 of adjustment costs, the nature of the output
 market, and the degree of returns to scale. In the
 next section we will discuss the empirical results
 obtained when the model is estimated using yearly
 data for U.S. total manufacturing.
 III. Econometric Specification and
 Empirical Results
 In reporting and discussing the empirical re-
 sults we have chosen to proceed from the "specific
 to the general" in terms of model specification.
 The simplest case we report corresponds to the
 standard Q model with perfect competition in
 the output market commonly found in the litera-
 ture. We then show how the empirical perfor-
 mance of the model changes when moving to
 more general specifications. More specifically, we
 first introduce monopolistic competition in the
 investment equation, we then discuss the role of
 nonconstant returns to scale, and finally we allow
 for the impact of adjustment costs for labor on
 investment decisions.
 All the models involve expected values of fu-
 ture variables. Since we assume that expectations
 are rational, we can replace them by their reali-
 zations and use the method of instrumental
 variables (McCallum (1976)). Any subset of in-
 formation available to the agents represents a le-
 gitimate instrument set when the estimating
 equation contains only white noise expectational
 errors. If we include, in addition to the constants
 b and d, two serially uncorrelated additive
 stochastic terms in the adjustment cost function,
 the composite disturbance in the estimating equa-
 tion will exhibit a moving average structure of
 order one (MA(1)). In order to take this possibil-
 ity into account, we use instruments dated t - 1
 or earlier. In addition, we report the serial corre-
 lation test proposed by Breusch and Godfrey
 (1981) for AR(1)/MA(1) errors and the Sargan
 (1964) misspecifications test on the correlation
 between the residuals and the instruments.3
 3Since we always reject the presence of MA(1)/AR(1)
 residuals, the use of instruments dated t or earlier may be
 legitimate. When contemporaneous instruments are used, the
 results remain very similar to the ones presented in the tables
 and are not reported here.
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 TABLE 1.-Q MODELS OF INVESTMENT: PERFECr AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
 IN THE OUTPUT MARKET; LABOR AS A VARIABLE INPUT
 SAMPLE PERIOD: 1951-1985; DEPENDENT VARIABLE: D(I/K,)
 Explanatory Variables (1) (2)
 1 - +, 0.185 (3.826) 0.295 (4.038)
 DQt 0.054 (2.306) 0.084 (2.633)
 Y,/(1- )Kt1 -0.0042 (2.214)
 DDUM, 0.025 (2.568) 0.030 (2.616)
 a 18.657 (2.306) 12.531 (2.567)
 b 0.185 (3.826) 0.295 (4.038)
 E 20.00 (2.289)
 H 0.00126 0.00077
 Sargan 13.150 [9] 5.416 [8]
 Breusch-Godfrey 0.964 - 0.222
 Notes: (i) Column (1) corresponds to the perfect competition case; column (2) corresponds to the monopolistic
 competition case. (ii) DUM, is a dummy variable equal to one in 1973 and 1974 and zero otherwise (see Holland
 and Myers (1984), table 2B2b note d). (iii) H is the minimized value of the objective function; Sargan is a
 misspecification test, distributed as x2 with (m - n) degrees of freedom (m = number of instruments; n = number
 of regressors); Breusch-Godfrey is a test for MA(1)/AR(1) errors, distributed as a standardized normal. Asymp-
 totic robust t-statistics in round brackets; degrees of freedom in square brackets. (iv) The instrument set for both
 equations is constant, DDUM,, I,_,/K,2, K, T,, , _,,a, Au- ,A /K_K2, I-2/K1-2, R_,, DQ_2, Y1_, /
 (1 - 6)K-2,_Y32/ -' ) x ' - 3
 The models have been estimated for the period
 1951-1985 using yearly U.S. manufacturing data.4
 In the theoretical section materials were omitted
 from the production function for ease of nota-
 tion. However, if they are included and the pro-
 duction function is assumed to be homogeneous
 in K, L, I, X, and materials, then all the deriva-
 tions go through. Moreover, Y should be inter-
 preted as output and not value added in the
 definition of C, in equation (6). For this reason
 we have used gross output data in estimation.5
 In table 1, column (1), we report the estimates
 of the equation relating investment to tax-
 adjusted Q, obtained under the assumption of
 constant returns to scale, perfectly competitive
 output market, and labor as a variable factor\,so
 that E = oo and c = d = 0 in equation (13). Both
 the dependent variable and the regressors are
 expressed as quasi-forward differences. The de-
 preciation rate for capital is set to a value of
 0.0965. We include in the equation also a dummy
 variable to account for the fact that the value of
 the firms in the manufacturing sector, derived
 from the capitalization of dividends for the years
 1973-74, may be seriously mismeasured (see
 Holland and Myers (1984)).
 In column (2) we allow for a monopolistic
 output market. The results suggest that the out-
 put-capital ratio enters the equation in the way
 suggested by the theory, its coefficient has the
 expected sign and it is quite significant. Although
 the departure from perfect competition is one of
 the reasons that justifies the presence of the
 output-capital ratio in the equation, it is not the
 only one. For instance, assume that the market
 value of the firm is an imperfect and noisy mea-
 sure for expected future profits. In this case the
 significance of output may also depend upon its
 role as a predictor of future profitability. The size
 of the coefficient of Q increases and the good-
 ness of fit statistic improves, using as a criterion
 the value of the objective function that is mini-
 mized by the instrumental variable estimator. The
 Sargan test is borderline at conventional levels in
 the case of the model in column (1) whereas it
 does not indicate misspecification for the model
 of column (2). This is consistent with the omission
 of the output variable from the more restricted
 regression.
 The increase in the coefficient of the Q vari-
 able is a hopeful sign but still implies a slow
 speed of adjustment of investment to exogenous
 shocks. The elasticity of investment with respect
 to changes in Q ranges between 0.20 and 0.31.
 This is to be compared with values in the range of
 0.1-0.3 in Abel and Blanchard (1986), values of
 0.14-0.23 in Summers (1981), and a value of 0.27
 4Strictly speaking, estimation of the model on aggregate
 data is appropriate under the assumption that all firms are
 identical. More loosely, the estimated parameters can be
 interpreted as averages for the entire manufacturing sector.
 5An appendix describing the sources of data and construc-
 tion of variables is available from the authors upon request.
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 TABLE 2.-Q MODELS OF INVESTMENT: MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN
 THE OUTPUT MARKET; LABOR AS A QUASI-FIXED FACTOR
 SAMPLE PERIOD: 1951-1985; DEPENDENT VARIABLE: D(I,/K,)
 Explanatory Variables (1) (2)
 1 - ot 0.104 (1.804)
 DQ, 0.037 (3.916)
 Yll(1- )K, -0.0041 (3.268)
 [(1 - y)/(l - 8)ID((X,/L,XL,_1/K,_1)) -4.393 (2.003)
 [(1 - y)/( - 8)ID(L,1/K,1) 3.792 (4.246)
 DDUM, 0.011 (5.009) 0.009 (3.638)
 a 30.083 (3.432) 80.682 (3.476)
 b 0.104 (1.804) -
 e 9.177 (2.433) 5.933 (3.905)
 c 132.14 (2.845) 2781.5 (2.843)
 d 0.863 (1.584) 0.093 (4.135)
 s -816.3 (1.707)
 a 0.296 (2.933)
 H 0.00074 0.00015
 Sargan 15.903 [101 11.189 [9]
 Breusch-Godfrey 1.548 1.636
 Notes (see also table 1): (i) Column (1) corresponds to the case of no interrelated adjustment costs; column (2)
 corresponds to the interrelated case. (ii) The instrument set used in table I is, for both equations, augmented by
 the following variables: X,_ 1/L,_ 1, D[(X,-2/L,-2)(L,-3/K, _3)L D(L,-2/K,-2), Y1,2/(1 -)L,_3-
 in Hayashi (1982).6 The elasticity of demand im-
 plied by the estimates is rather large. We have
 remarked that if there are nonconstant returns to
 scale of degree (1 + 6) in the net production
 function, it is not possible to recover 6 and E
 separately. In general, if there are increasing
 (decreasing) returns to scale, the assumnption of
 constant returns (6 = 0) maintained here leads to
 overestimating (underestimating) the demand
 elasticity. A way to tackle this problem is to
 estimate a demand equation for output jointly
 with the investment equation, under the assump-
 tion that the elasticity of demand faced by each
 individual firm equals the elasticity of demand for
 aggregate manufacturing output. We have pur-
 sued empirically this option by assuming (Shapiro
 (1987)) that the ratio between manufacturing out-
 put, Y, and GNP, Z, is a loglinear function of the
 ratio between the manufacturing price level, P,
 and the aggregate price level, V. The inverse
 demand function can be written in terms of
 growth rates as
 A log(-) = -Alog(f) + Aut (16)
 where Au is a taste shock. When (16) is estimated
 jointly with (13), the value of the demand elastic-
 ity decreases to 4.0 and the returns to scale
 parameter 6 is equal to 0.26 with a t-ratio of
 1.29.7 Although the point estimate suggests the
 possibility of increasing returns to scale, the evi-
 dence is weak and the hypothesis of constant
 returns cannot be rejected.8
 If nonconstant returns to scale affect only the
 gross production function, then the term
 (0/2)[((It/Kt) - b)2(Kt/(l - 8)Kt_ 1)] should be
 added to the right hand side of (13) and the
 model is just identified, even without specifying a
 demand function. When implementing this model,
 however, the variability in the data was insuffi-
 cient to yield reliable estimates of the returns to
 scale parameter together with the other struc-
 tural coefficients. However, a Lagrange multiplier
 test of the significance of 6 (distributed x2 with
 one degree of freedom) was performed, yielding a
 value of 0.655. Hence, the hypothesis of constant
 returns in gross production cannot be rejected.9
 6 See p. 266 in Abel and Blanchard (1986), table 5 p. 93 in
 Summers (1981), and p. 222 in Hayashi (1982).
 7There are no relevant changes instead in the estimated
 values of the adjustment cost parameters.
 8See Morrison (1988) and Chirinko (1989) for a similar
 procedure in the context of models based on parameteriza-
 tions of both technology and demand, in which evidence is
 found in favor of increasing returns.
 9The same conclusion is reached by calculating a Wald type
 of statistic based on testing the significance of the three
 additional regressors obtained by multiplying out the addi-
 tional term described in the text. The test statistic (distributed
 x2 (3)) has a value of 6.42. Finally, these results are also
 confirmed by the joint estimation of the investment model
 together with a demand function, along the lines described
 above.
This content downloaded from 159.149.192.32 on Wed, 08 Jan 2020 14:24:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 390 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
 In table 2 we report the results of estimating
 equation (13) when there is monopolistic compe-
 tition and there are adjustment costs in changing
 the level of employment.10 We provide two sets
 of results. In column (1) we present estimates of
 (13) assuming that there is no interrelated com-
 ponent in adjustment costs; in column (2) we
 allow for interrelated costs and include the term
 specified in (15). In this latter case the model is
 nonlinear in variables and we only present esti-
 mates of the structural parameters. Note that in
 this case we have set the constant in the adjust-
 ment cost function for capital, b, equal to zero
 because it was insignificant. In column (1) the
 coefficients of the terms representing marginal
 adjustment costs for labor have the sign expected
 a priori and are significant, which is also true for
 the remaining parameters. In column (2) the in-
 terrelation coefficient s has an asymptotic t-ratio
 of 1.707, and the other parameters are again
 quite precisely determined. The fit of the equa-
 tion increases, basically because the second term
 in (15) is highly correlated with the dependent
 variable. Again, the hypothesis of constant re-
 turns to scale affecting the net production func-
 tion cannot be rejected when a demand equation
 is also estimated. The value of the parameter 6 is
 0.155 with a t-ratio of 0.951 for the model with no
 interrelated adjustment costs, and 0.091 with a
 t-ratio of 0.969 for the interrelated costs model.
 The estimate of the elasticity of demand remains
 basically unchanged."
 It is instructive to discuss the value of the
 structural parameters implied by our estimates
 and to compare them with those obtained by
 other researchers. Allowing for labor as a quasi-
 fixed factor decreases the estimate of elasticity of
 demand from 20 in table 1 to 9.2 and 5.9 in
 columns (1)-(2) of table 2.12 This latter evidence
 implies a markup of price over marginal costs of
 12.2%-20.3%. This is quite close to the range of
 estimates found by Morrison (1988) (11%-23%)
 and for two-digit manufacturing industries by Hall
 (1986, 1988).13 The evaluation of the adjustment
 costs for capital is a delicate issue since they
 depend both upon the multiplicative parameter a
 and the constant b. The value of the constant is
 large enough in table 1 to imply unacceptable
 negative marginal costs of adjustment for capital,
 when calculated at sample values. With labor as a
 quasi-fixed factor but no interrelated adjustment
 costs, the estimated value of the constant de-
 creases and marginal adjustment costs for capital
 become positive, on average, although very small
 (0.1% of output). In the most general model in
 which the constant is set equal to zero and inter-
 related adjustment costs are present, adjustment
 costs for investment are 1.7% of output or 4.2%
 of value added. This is larger than the figure of
 0.7% of value added found by Shapiro (1986).
 The large value of the constant d in the adjust-
 ment cost function gives rise to negative marginal
 adjustment costs for employment, when interre-
 lated adjustment costs are not allowed for, as in
 column (1) of table 2. However, when interrelat-
 edness is permitted, as in column (2) of table 2,
 the sign is correct and we find the marginal
 adjustment costs for labor to be, on average,
 4.6% of output or 11.5% of value added. As in
 Shapiro (1986) we find that marginal adjustment
 costs for labor are higher than for capital. How-
 ever, our estimates of the former are much higher
 than the figure of 1.8% of value added found by
 Shapiro.
 IV. Conclusions
 In the theoretical section of this paper we have
 analyzed the implications of monopolistic compe-
 10 In both cases we used the average value of the quit rate,
 , for the period 1951-1980. The data were not available after
 1980.
 l lSimilar evidence emerges for the constant returns to scale
 hypothesis in the gross production function on the basis of the
 Wald statistics. The W test has a value of 5.678 for the model
 in column (1) and of 1.185 for the one in column (2) (with 6
 and 7 degrees of freedom, respectively). Estimation of a
 demand equation along with the investment model leads to
 the same result.
 12 The assumption of a constant elasticity of demand is
 clearly an approximation that may or may not be adequate.
 The two diagnostic tests we have provided do not suggest any
 significant form of misspecification.
 13 In order to make our estimates comparable with Hall's,
 the markup ratios based on gross output must be converted to
 those based on value added, using the formula in Hall (1986),
 p. 294. Our markup in terms of value added is in the range of
 28%-51%.
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 tition and labor adjustment costs for Q models of
 investment. This has allowed us to derive a gener-
 alized Q model for investment, emphasizing the
 relationship between investment, hiring, the aver-
 age market value of the firm and output. Esti-
 mates of the adjustment costs and demand pa-
 rameters can be recovered and the assumption of
 perfect competition, constant returns to scale,
 and absence of labor adjustment costs can be
 tested.
 The overall conclusion that can be derived
 from the empirical results presented in this paper
 is that standard Q models can be considerably
 generalized by adopting different assumptions
 about the output market and the structure of
 adjustment costs. Monopolistic competition intro-
 duces output in the investment equation, in addi-
 tion to Q, and provides a rationale for its fre-
 quently observed significance in empirical work.
 The results also suggest that it is important to
 treat labor as a quasi-fixed factor and to allow
 adjustment costs to be interrelated. Empirically,
 adjustment costs for labor appear to be quantita-
 tively more important than those for capital. Fi-
 nally, little evidence is found against the hypothe-
 sis of constant returns to scale.
 Obviously, the model has limitations and can
 be extended in several directions. It would be
 useful, for example, to distinguish between dif-
 ferent types of workers who may be characterized
 by different adjustment costs. Moreover, the
 model could be usefully estimated on more disag-
 gregated data in order to allow demand and
 technology parameters to differ across industries.
 In future research we plan to address these and
 other issues. However, we have shown that
 quasi-fixity of labor and monopolistic competition
 are critical ingredients in the theoretical and em-
 pirical reformulation of generalized Q models.
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